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ABSTRACT 
We have developed a theoretical link between the existence of a son preference and the quantity 
and quality of children. In our model, decisions about the quantity and quality of children are 
interdependent and are influenced by a son preference. A son preference substantially widens the 
gap between the quality of female and male children, and increases the possibility of having more 
children to realize this preference. An increase in the level of son preference lowers the average 
level of education, especially for female children. For households with a son preference, having a 
female birth at each birth order significantly increased the probability of having more children, 
with a magnitude which is much larger than that suggested in Dahl and Moretti (2008). More 
interestingly, once such households have a son, there is a significant reduction in that household’s 
likelihood of having more children. Furthermore, our findings establish the causal effect of a son 
preference on the quantity and quality of children within a family as a son preference is found to 
greatly reduce households’ sensitivity to the change in the shadow price of quantity as well as 
quality.  
Keywords: Son Preference; the Quantity and the Quality of Children 
JEL: I2, J24, J31 
I. Introduction 
“A woman’s virtue is to have no talent” 女子无才便是德1。 
There is a large amount of literature on growth models which highlights the importance of gender 
inequality (as a result of gender preference) in economic growth2 through the channel of human 
capital differentiation between different genders. The impacts of gender differences have been 
observed in many different domains, perhaps most notably in labor market (e.g., Blau and Kahn 
2000). Gender inequality (or gender preference) is deeply rooted in countries with a large fraction 
of its population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, in patrilineal societies and cultures with 
a tradition of ancestor worship, and it has also found a foothold in some developed economies3. 
One form of gender inequality is perfectly mirrored in the son preference cultures around the world. 
Son preference is more obvious and more severe in some countries than in others. For example, 
the son preference culture is much stronger in Asian countries4 than in Western Europe. We have 
focused specifically on the son preference because of its impact on the human capital, and hence 
on economic growth, and because the previous research has little to say about the mechanism 
underlying the impacts of a son preference on the quantity and quality of children. The quantity 
and quality of children are often inspired by specific demand. Empirical evidence indicates that 
children from larger families have lower average educational attainments. However, such evidence 
does not explain why children within a family may have very different levels of education 
regardless of family size. It is intriguing, although challenging, to understand why some families 
choose to have more children but others do not, and more importantly, how the underlying 
                                                          
1 The original quotation reads: “眉公曰：丈夫有德便是才，女子无才便是德。此语殊为未确。” (出自清·张岱
《公祭祁夫人文》). 
2 For example, Lagerlöf 1999; Galor and Weil 1996; Barro 1991; Bloom and Williamson 1998; Taylor 1998; Barro 
and Lee 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Dollar and Gatti 1999; Forbes 2000; Lorgelly and Owen 1999; Knowles 
et al. 2002. 
3 According to a 2011 Gallup survey and a Pew report, a son preference also occurs in the U.S. And, a continuous son 
preference was observed in Finland among the national majority and the Swedish speaking minority (Andersson et al. 
2007). 
4 For instance, the son preference in South Korea was once considered stronger than anywhere else in the world 
(Goodkind 1999; Park and Cho 1995). All countries with a significantly skewed sex ratio at birth are in Asia. 
rationales that bolster decisions to have more children have a cause effect on both the family size 
and the quality of children.  
In his seminal paper on the theory of fertility choice, Gary S. Becker (1960) introduced fertility 
choice into the realm of economic analysis. Since then, children have been treated as consumer 
durables. Although Becker acknowledged that preferences may vary across households, the impact 
of a preference such as gender preference on endowment and on any interactions between the 
quantity and quality of children was not addressed in his papers, nor in any papers with coauthors. 
The literature that extends the quantity and quality model introduced by Becker (1960) is quite 
extensive; despite this, however, they fail to capture the effects of the essential parental 
characteristics on the quantity and quality of children. We believe that it is crucial to include these 
parental characteristics in the quantity-quality model as they could affect both family size and 
children’s educational outcome5.   
The family environment is widely believed to be a primary factor in determining children’s 
educational outcomes (Black et al. 2005). In some societies, the son bears the responsibility of 
continuing the family line, which is a critically important aspect of the “quality” of a child that 
parents are looking for in these cultures, and males are in general have higher earning power than 
females, which can also lead to a preference for sons over daughters (Qian 2008). We believe that 
a son preference is a very important component of a family environment, and it has some causal 
effects on the quantity and quality of children within a family. But, how does the son preference 
affect households’ decisions on both the quantity and quality of children? We argue that to answer 
this question, it is essential to account for the fact that parents in societies with a strong son 
preference culture value sons more than daughters6.  
                                                          
5 Family size and children’s educational outcome can be endogenously determined by parents. In societies with no 
compulsory education system, children’s education attainment is decided by their parents according to, for example, 
differentiated labor market returns to education for men vs. women and family’s need in labor supply from their 
children.  
6 Considering children as consumable durable, the justification for those households with a strong son preference place 
a higher value on a son than on a daughter is comparable with consumers who are strongly attached to a particular 
brand, in which case they would place higher a preference or value on products from that particular brand than from 
other brands.  
We develop a theoretical link between the existence of a son preference and the quantity and 
quality of children. In our model, the quantity and quality decisions about children are 
interdependent and are influenced by a son preference. A son preference substantially widens the 
gap between the quality of female and male children in households with a son preference, and 
increases the possibility of having more children to realize this preference. An increase in the level 
of son preference lowers the average level of education, especially for female children. In this 
article, we conduct several empirical tests showing the importance of this channel in households’ 
decision in the quality and quantity of children. 
Our analysis has yielded the following findings. Foremost, irrespective of how our findings are 
interpreted, we have shown that children’s gender matters in terms of households’ decisions about 
their educational outcomes and about the number of children to have. After controlling for a 
number of factors, ranging from geographic locations 7  to variables which measure regional 
economic developments, we found that female children receive significantly lower levels of 
education than their male siblings. We have taken the following approach to distinguish the causal 
effect of a son preference on the quality of children. We have compared the quality of children of 
opposite sexes by using multiple birth samples (where members of twins or triplets from each 
household were of opposite sexes), while also controlling for family background characteristics. 
By doing so, we addressed the following two concerns. First, the issue of endogeneity, which is 
the educational investment in each child is decided by parents, and hence may be related to other 
unobservable parental and other family characteristics. By using multiple birth data, we were able 
to control for these characteristics as these twins (triplets) would have concurrently experienced 
similar changes in the unobservable parental and other family characteristics. Second, using the 
multiple birth data helped to alleviate concerns that any differences in the quality of male and 
female children was as a consequence of significant changes in the socioeconomic and educational 
environment for children of different genders and of a different age or because children from the 
                                                          
 
same family would have both inherited very different intellectual ability from their parents8. Doing 
so yielded an even wider gap in the quality of female and male children. 
Second, we find that for households with a son preference, having a female birth at each birth order 
significantly increased the probability of having more children, which is much larger than that 
suggested in Dahl and Moretti (2008). More interestingly, once such households have a son, this 
reduces significantly the probability of having more children, and this negative effect ranges from 
5.6% to 41.8% depending on the birth-order of the son.    
Third, the strong existence of a son preference in rural China compared to that found in urban areas 
can be explained by the paramount differences between the two areas in terms of such factors as 
the distinctive features of China’s welfare system9 and the fact that job opportunities are more 
concentrated and diverse in urban areas. Such differences between the two areas have shaped the 
large differences in people’s perceptions of the quality of children of different genders. Based on 
these clear differences, we were able to quantify the level of son preference in rural China, where 
the estimated son preference in rural China ranged between 0.20 and 1 across the three waves of 
CHIPS, where earlier years’ rural samples are associated with a stronger son preference. 
A final observation is in order. As we have used Chinese data to estimate empirically the impact 
of a son preference on the quality and quantity of children, we need to highlight the differences 
between the son preference culture in China and other countries. Although, son preference culture 
is not unique to China, as shown by Dahl and Moretti (2008) who concluded that parents in the 
U.S. favor boys over girls, we argue that the nature of China’s son preference differs significantly 
from other countries.  Son preference may originate from cultural considerations, as well as factors 
such as a concern for care of the elderly, but in China, many people continue to endorse the 
                                                          
8 Both the boys and the girls from pairs of twins (triplets, quadruplets and so on) were free from their parents’ gender 
preference, so they receive unbiased and equal care during pregnancy; and more importantly, twins (triplets, 
quadruplets and so on) share either some or all of the same genomes, so we have strong reason to believe that they 
will have inherited very similar intellectual ability from their parents. 
9 China’s social welfare system is linked to its hukou system. During our sampling time periods, only those holding 
non-agricultural hukou status had access to healthcare, employment, retirement pensions, housing, and education 
programs provided by the government, while most rural residents are generally expected to provide for themselves 
(Young 2013). 
traditional belief that “there are three unfilial things in your life, and to leave no posterity10 is the 
worst” (Shi 1982). China has a strong son preference culture in its rural areas (Goodkind 2015), 
where many villagers’ lifetime goal is to have sons (Li 1995; Wasserstrom 1984). The strength of 
the son preference in China is partially evidenced in Amartya Sen’s book ‘More than 100 Million 
Women Are Missing’. Furthermore, other factors (e.g.  economic factors) fail to explain the highly 
skewed sex ratio at birth (SRB) observed in Asian countries, as none of the developed economies, 
with the exception of South Korea11, has a SRB above 1.10. A number of studies has confirmed 
that the highly skewed SRB in China is largely due to the persistent and strong son preference 
culture in China (Ebenstein 2010; Chen et al. 2013; Wang 2019). If this is how the son preference 
works in China, it suggests a very different mechanism from that which seemingly functions in 
other countries, such as in the U.S.  
Our findings are related to three bodies of literature. First, by estimating empirically the level of 
son preference, our study contributes to the small but growing body of literature on the persistence 
of this phenomenon (Shi 2009; Ebenstein and Leung 2010; Almond et al. 2013; Hu and Tian 2018; 
Zhang 2019). Second, our study is related to previous research examining the impact of a son 
preference on educational attainment and parents’ investment in their children (e.g., Rosenzweig 
and Schultz 1982; Chen et al. 1981; Das Gupta 1987; Ahmad and Morduch 1993; Thomas 1994; 
Burgess and Zhuang 2001; Park and Rukumnuaykit 2004; Kugler and Kumar 2017; Barcellos et 
al. 2014). Our findings show that a son preference both lowers significantly the average level of 
education, and has a very large negative impact on the quality of female children.  
Third, our study augments the literature regarding the tradeoff between the quantity and quality of 
children, as pioneered by Gary S. Becker. What sets our study apart from that of Becker and his 
coauthors’ works, as well as others (e.g. Qian 2009; Black et al. 2005), is that we have incorporated 
the son preference into the relationship between the quantity and quality of children, and we have 
found that a son preference exerts significantly more impact than that of the quantity of children 
                                                          
10 Having no posterity refers to having no son, as ancestor worship is an important part of Chinese culture (Schwartz 
1985), and it needs to be performed by male descendants. Having no male descendants means the discontinuation of 
the line of ancestry. 
11 The son preference in South Korea was once believed stronger than in any other country (Goodkind 1999; Park and Cho 1995). 
on children’s quality. Our findings also suggest that, in societies with a son preference, the quantity 
and quality of children interacts largely because parents in the process of realizing their son 
preference need to adjust their decisions about the quantity and quality of their children. A son 
preference can play a critical role in the interaction between the quality and quantity of children 
because: 1) it greatly reduces households’ sensitivity to the change in the shadow price of quantity 
as well as quality, and 2) the expected sizable increase in households’ marginal utility owing to 
the realization of a son preference.   
The implications from both our theoretical model and empirical findings confirm that the son 
preference is the driving force behind the gender gap in education in China. Based on our analysis, 
we have found that a son preference affects the quality of children more than the quantity of 
children, and it also affects both the shadow price of quality and the shadow price of quantity12. 
The rationale behind this is that in a strong son preference culture, a son is considered to carry the 
intrinsic quality (or ability) of providing more economic returns to the family than would be the 
case for a daughter, to continue the family line and to provide care for elderly family members 
and/or fulfill any inheritance requirements. Therefore, parents with a son preference are more 
likely to stop producing children only when they have at least one son13. When more births are 
required to realize the son preference, an increase in the quantity of children inevitably lowers the 
quality of children, especially the quality of daughters. Within their particular budget constraints, 
having a son is the priority of the household with a strong son preference, while such households 
are less demanding about the quality of their children compared to those with no clear gender 
preference, all else being equal. The negative relationship between quantity and quality is robustly 
confirmed to be negatively correlated across households, however, households with a son 
preference are found to differentiate strategically on the quality of their children based on their 
gender rather than to want approximately equal levels of quality for each of their children. 
                                                          
12 Recall that: an interaction between the quantity and quality that causes significant changes in both shadow price of 
quantity and of quality is the key element that generates a trade-off between quantity and quality. 
13 Our hypothesis that households possessing a son preference, for the sake of having a son, will very likely continue 
to have more children, is premised on the following cultural features of Chinese families with a son preference. First, 
sons are considered as permanent members of the family, and they will maintain lifelong financial relationships with 
their parents. Second, sons take responsibility for looking after their parents’ economic and physical wellbeing, 
whereas daughters, once married, will contribute mainly to their in-laws’ families.   
Therefore, the proposition endorsed by Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 1973; Willis 1973; Becker 
and Tomes 1976; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980, that “the quantity and quality of children interact 
because parents tend to want approximately equal levels of quality for each of their children” is, 
in general, not supported among households with a son preference.  
Our paper proceeds as follows: the next section describes the data, and Section III outlines the 
identification strategies in estimating the results. Section IV reports the estimations and discusses 
the findings, and section V develops the model, and presents the implications suggested by the 
model. Finally, Section VI presents the conclusion.   
 
II. Construction of the datasets 
 
2.1 The data sample 
In estimating the impact of a son preference on the quality and the quantity of children, we made 
use of three out of the seven waves (1988 to 2013) of the Chinese Household Income Project 
Survey (CHIPS), namely those from 1988, 1995 and 2002. These are seven years apart, which we 
consider to be a time period which is neither too short nor too long for the purposes of comparison 
studies between the different waves. Those individuals surveyed in the first two waves were largely 
free from the impact of the one-child policy and the ‘Nine Years Compulsory Education System’14, 
while the one-child policy had more of an impact on the 2002 wave than the other two, the impact 
was still much milder compared to those in later years. This justifies the use of only the first three 
waves of survey data. Each survey collected data from households selected randomly from both 
rural and urban populations, and they covered very large and extensive geographic areas in China. 
The information of all members of each household is recorded. Each survey contains household 
information on their income, expenditure, and demographics, as well as geographic information, 
occupational information, assets and so forth. A more detailed description of each of the seven 
                                                          
14 By restricting our sample to those children who are above 18 years old, these children’s educational outcomes from 
these two waves of CHIPS are not affected by the ‘Nine Years Compulsory Education System’.  
waves of the survey is reported on the official website of the China Institute for Income 
Distribution at Beijing Normal University.  
The units of observation are children, to which we link the demographic information of their 
parents and the household level information from each CHIPS, accordingly. We constructed 18 
subsamples in total from the three waves of CHIPS, which were divided equally between both the 
rural population and the urban population, as well as between the three waves of CHIPS. The size 
of each sample depends on both the original size of the surveys and the number of missing values 
of the key variables of interest, and the associated control variables. Some summary statistics of 
the samples are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.      
2.2 Data to estimate the effect of a son preference on the quality of children 
To investigate the impact of a son preference on the quality of children, we constructed data on 
some of the children included in each of the three waves15. As children from rural areas in China 
are raised and educated in socioeconomic, cultural and educational environments which are very 
different from those in urban areas, we studied separately the impact of a son preference on the 
quality of children for rural populations and urban populations.  
The key variables of interest are children’s education attainment (i.e. their level of education), their 
gender, and the number of children in a household. The dependent variable is the level of 
educational attainment. We have used the level of educational attainment as a measure of the 
quality of a child in relation to a son preference because the number of years a child is in education 
prior to the introduction of the ‘Nine Years Compulsory Education System’ in China is largely 
determined by the parents’ willingness to invest in their children’s education, and such decisions 
may be based on gender. The more years in education, the greater the loss of the anticipated income 
from the labor supply of the children, which discourages parents from providing more education 
and, more importantly, from providing equal educational opportunities for all children. The earlier 
their children can begin working, the sooner they can contribute to the family, and this is a 
                                                          
15 Children with missing values on the key variables, as well as control variables, were dropped from the sample. As 
the quality of children is measured by their educational attainment, we only included those which were older than 18 
years.  
convincing strategy to follow when the returns from education are not considered by rural 
populations to be favorable, and parents are not obliged to send their children to school. However, 
it should be noted that the educational inequality between genders narrowed considerably 
alongside China’s rapid economic development. In addition, the ‘Nine Years Compulsory 
Education System’, which took effect in late 1986, helped both to significantly enlarge the student 
population, and to reduce the drop-out rate of students, especially that of female students, even in 
the rural areas (Ding 2012).  
The education level16 (education attainment) is coded from 8 to 1, where 8 represents the highest 
level of education (university level). For the gender variable, males are coded as 0, while females 
are 1. In our study, to control for demographic as well as regional effects on the quality of children, 
we also included the fathers’ education attainment17, a variable called minority18, the family 
income, and variables featuring geographic characteristics and locational information.  
We extracted a total of 12 subsamples from the three waves of CHIPS, to enable the study of the 
effect of a son preference on the quality of children. More specifically, for each wave, we compiled 
two samples for the rural population and two for the urban population. For both the rural and the 
urban samples, the larger sample contained all children with no missing values on the variables 
mentioned above, while the smaller sample contained only data on twins, triplets, quadruplets and 
so on, of opposite sexes19. However, we did not distinguish between the different types of twins20, 
triplets, quadruplets and so on. The multiple births sample was used to confirm the robustness of 
the results from using the larger sample.  
2.3 Data to estimate the effect of a son preference on the quantity of children 
                                                          
16 In more detail, the education level was coded as 1 for someone who had never attended formal education, 2 for the 
lower elementary school (below year 3), 3 for upper elementary school, 4 for junior middle school, 5 for senior middle 
school (including professional middle school), 6 for technical secondary school, 7 for junior college, and 8 for 
college/university.  
17 Using mothers’ education level did not lead to qualitatively different results.  
18 There are 56 ethnic groups in China, with the Han group considered as the majority. All other ethnic groups are 
considered as a minority.  
19 For example, we stipulated that they are twins of opposite sexes.  
20 That is, we dis not distinguish between, for example, whether twins were identical (monozygotic) or fraternal 
(dizygotic). 
To investigate the impact of a son preference on the quantity of children, we first used the six 
larger samples constructed in Section 2.2 respectively for both the rural and urban populations. 
Here, the number of children in a household taken as the dependent variable (i.e. the quantity of 
children). We also included the fathers’ level of educational attainment, the minority variable, the 
family income, and the other control variables in the regression analysis. The key variables of 
interest are gender and quality (i.e. the educational attainment of a child).  
The CHIPS data sets we use provide information on each child of a household and contain a panel 
component. To take advantage of this, we construct six additional samples which incorporated a 
dummy typed variable, called SonDummy 21 . The SonDummy variable helps to distinguish 
households with a son preference from those possess no clear son preference in their decisions on 
whether or not to have another child after the birth of a son. The SonDummy variable, together 
with the gender of each child sorted by their birth order, were used to capture the impact of the son 
preference on the quantity of children by considering both the impact of the birth of a son and the 
sex composition of the current children on the quantity of children. We included in the samples as 
many children’s observations as possible, by including only the following variables in the 
robustness test, namely the quantity of children, the gender of the children, and the SonDummy22. 
We could do this because both the independent variable gender and the SonDummy have very 
small correlations with the other independent variables, and the inclusion or exclusion of the other 
independent variables did not qualitatively change the results. By doing so, we dropped very few 
children’s observations from each wave of CHIPS. In estimating the effect of a son preference on 
the quantity of children, children of all ages are included in the study. 
 
III. Identification 
                                                          
21 To construct the SonDummy variable, we first sorted the children of each household according to their birth order, 
and numbered the first-born child as 1, the second-born child as 2, and so on. The SonDummy takes the value of zero, 
corresponding to the female children who were born to a household before the first-born male, while it takes value of 
1 once a son has been born into the family. The number of observations of the SonDummy equals the number of 
children in a household.   
22 Using the SonDummy either as an independent variable in the Poisson regression or as a data selection condition 
in the Poisson regression did not produce qualitatively different results.  
The following reduced form analyses were employed to empirically estimate the impact of the son 
preference on both the quality and quantity of children.  
3.1 Using gender to identify the effect of a son preference on the quality of children 
We consider the impact of the gender of a child on the quality of children is a natural candidate to 
use to represent the son preference of a household. The son preference of a household will be 
reflected in the differentiated quality of children, measured by their educational attainment, with 
their parents as the ‘investors’ in their children’s education. All else being equal, a household with 
a son preference is likely to invest more in the education of their sons than in their daughters. The 
presence of such an effect is confirmed if gender exerts a significantly negative impact on the 
quality of those female children.  
China is a vast country with huge discrepancies in the development of socioeconomic and 
education system across its provinces, and even across counties within a certain province. 
Therefore, we have included geographic dimensions in capturing factors other than a son 
preference in the study of the quality of children. The trade-off between the quality and the quantity 
of children suggests the inclusion of the quantity of children in the study. We therefore propose 
the following reduced form equation, which will be used to estimate the impact of a son preference 
on the quality of children: 
Quliaty𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 = 𝛼1𝑘 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝑎3𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛼4𝐸𝑑𝑢𝐹𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛼5𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑘𝑤
+ 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛼7(𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑘𝑤) + 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝜖𝑗𝑘𝑤. 
                  (1) 
We regress the quality of children (i.e. quality of child 𝑖 of household 𝑗 who lives in area 𝑘 - either 
rural or urban, and who is taken from the survey data collected in year 𝑤) on gender, the quantity 
of children and other controls. The variables with four digits of subscript are individual level data, 
and variables with three digits of subscript are household level data. The father’s educational 
attainment is used to control for a household’s level of endowment. The ethnic minority groups 
enjoy preferential treatment from the Chinese government, such as exemption from the population 
control policies, lower university entrance scores and lower tax thresholds. Consequently, it is 
meaningful to distinguish households from ethnic minorities. Minority is a dummy variable, which 
is equal to zero if a household is Han, and equal to one where it belongs to another ethnic group. 
Unlike most other countries, China’s hukou system clearly defines each individual’s resident status 
as either rural or urban, which distinguishes individuals, for example, in their eligibility for access 
to public health and other welfare systems. Therefore, there was no difficulty in identifying 
whether an individual is from a rural or an urban area. Our locational variables comprise 
information about the geographical features surrounding the areas where households are situated. 
They also contain information on whether a rural resident is living closer to cities, which helps to 
differentiate those rural households who live closer to cities than other rural households from the 
same county but further away from cities. These locational variables and other household level 
variables allow us to difference out household specific characteristics that are affecting children’s 
education. All explanatory variables are confirmed to either have very small correlations or the 
absolute value of the correlations was approximately 0.30. To control for cohort effects, we include 
indicator variables for age groups in the regressions. We estimated equation (1) for both rural and 
urban samples, and for those samples containing only twins (triplets and so on), and for samples 
containing all types of households.                   
3.2 Identifying the effect of a son preference on the quantity of children 
To obtain a quantitative estimate of the effect of a son preference on the quantity of children, we 
first estimated the following reduced form equation. 
Quantity𝑗𝑘𝑤 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑑𝑢𝐹𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑘𝑤 +
                                                 𝛽6𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛼7(𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑘𝑤) + 𝜈𝑗𝑘𝑤 .                   (2) 
                                                                                                                                                    
Quantity𝑗𝑘𝑤 is the number of children of household 𝑗 from area 𝑘 (either rural or urban) and is 
taken from CHIPS data in year 𝑤. The key independent variables of interest are gender and quality. 
We regress the quantity of children on children’s gender, the quality of children, and other controls. 
An increase in the quality of children exhausts some of the resources which may otherwise be used 
in producing more children, therefore, quality is expected to have a negative effect on Quantity𝑗𝑘𝑤. 
It is based on the rationale that a household with a son preference tends to increase the chance of 
having a son by having more children before they have a son, and thus a positive gender effect on 
Quantity𝑗𝑘𝑤 would capture this effect.  
Using specially constructed samples, we conducted the following reduced form analysis using 
Poisson regression, both to validate the earlier findings, and also to understand the households’ 
underlying rationales in determining the number of children.  
             Quantity𝑗𝑘𝑤 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝛾3𝑆𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 + 𝜂𝑗𝑘𝑤 .         (3) 
The quantity of children is regressed on the 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 and 𝑆𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤. The 
𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 is a dummy variable which represents the gender of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ born child in 
household 𝑗 from area 𝑘 and is taken from CHIPS wave 𝑤. 𝐵𝑖𝑟𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑤 is equal to 
zero if the 𝑖𝑡ℎ born child is female, and is equal to one if it is male. To differentiate between cases 
where a son joined different households at a different birth order, a dummy type variable 
𝑆𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 was introduced into the regressions. The 𝑆𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 was assigned a value of 
either zero or one to each child depending on whether a son has been born to a household. All 
female children born before the first-born male were assigned a value of zero, and once a son had 
been born to a household all subsequent births, including the first-born male, were assigned with 
a value of one. The merit of this variable is that it signifies the impact of the first-born male on a 
household’s decision of how many children to have. A significant 𝑆𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘  indicates 
strongly that the level of a son preference is important in determining the household’s decision 
about the number of children to have. Using data selected by a birth order variable23 for each round 
of estimations, we were able to uncover the impact of gender on the quantity of children at different 
birth orders. The gender effect on the quantity of children is validated by 1) both the gender of the 
child at each birth and the SonDummy or 2) independently by the two. Having no son motivates a 
                                                          
23 Our samples are unbalanced cross-sectional data where households differ in the number of children. The birth order 
variable, namely the variable labelled as id, is used to indicate the order of birth of each child in a household and 
serves as a data selection criteria in the regression. In other words, only data at the same level of birth order is selected 
for use in the regression. By doing so, we were able to identify the impact of gender on the quantity of children at each 
birth. The choice of whether to have another child is dependent on budget constraints, so even in a household with a 
very strong son preference the gender effect on the quantity of children is expected to gradually disappear as its number 
of children grow. For id=1, the corresponding dataset used in the regression contains households with one or more 
children, while when id=2, the dataset used in the regression contains households with two or more children, and so 
on.  
household to have an additional child in the hope that their son preference can be realized. 
Consequently, a child’s gender at each birth could have a noticeable influence on the total number 
of children produced by a household with a son preference.  
 
IV. Estimations 
4.1 The effect of a son preference on the quality of children 
The children in the 1988 and 1995 samples only include those who were over 18 years old, 
therefore, the results derived using these two samples are largely free from the impact of the one-
child policy and the ‘Nine Year Compulsory Education System’, and at the age of 18 it is very 
likely that the individual has completed formal education given that the average education level in 
China was quite low prior to 1978 (=1995-18). We report the estimation results in both Table 1 
and 224. 
The results concerning rural populations are reported in Table 1. In 1988, on average, girls from 
rural areas received at least one and a half years 25 less education than boys, and about a half year 
less in 1995. We interpret these findings as strong evidence that a child’s gender matters for their 
level of education, given that the average schooling was only approximately 7.326 years in both 
1988 and 1995. What is more striking is that before 200227, a child’s gender was, in general, found 
to have played a more decisive role than the quantity of children in determining a child’s 
educational attainment. Although the quantity of children has significant coefficients of between 
– 0.221 and – 0.037 for most subsamples, these numbers, on average, suggest a much smaller 
                                                          
24 The estimated results without using the indicators for age groups are presented in the Table A2 and A3 in the 
appendix. Those results are not qualitatively different from that has been reported in both Table 1 and 2 respectively. 
25 This is calculated as  0.496 ×3≈ 1.5, where 3 is the average number of years for each education level.   
26 7.3 is converted from the level of education specified in table A1 in the appendix to the number years of schooling.  
27 The reported coefficients in Table 1 are all at mean level. The largest families had eight, six and five children 
respectively in the 1988, 1995 and 2002 surveys, while the mean number of children is below four, three and two 
correspondingly. Therefore, the largest impact of the quantity of children on the quality of children is well below the 
magnitude of the impact of gender on the quality of children, even when we increased the number of children from its 
mean value to its maximum value.  
reduction in the average educational attainment of the children than is the case for gender in the 
earlier years’ samples.  
       Table 1  
The effect of a Son Preference on the Quality of Children for Rural Populations a – with indicator 
variables for age groups 
  1988 1995 2002 
 Larger 
Sample 
Multiple 
Births  
Larger 
Sample 
Multiple 
Births  
Larger 
Sample 
Multiple 
Births  
Gender – 0.496*** 
(.0271) 
– 0.808*** 
(.0988) 
– 0.171*** 
(.0212) 
– 0.218* 
(.1394) 
– 0.062** 
(.0267) 
– 0.203 
(.1515) 
Quantity – 0.061*** 
(.0107) 
– 0.099*** 
(.0372) 
– 0.037*** 
(.0117) 
– 0.221** 
(.0889) 
– 0.117*** 
(.0155) 
0.029 
(.1350) 
Education 
(Father) 
0.165*** 
(.0083) 
0.117*** 
(.0320) 
0.131*** 
(.0097) 
0.015 
(.0878) 
0.219*** 
(.0122) 
0.1282 
(.1080) 
Minority  – 0.239*** 
(.0514) 
– 0.158 
(.2039) 
0.279*** 
(.0403) 
0.996** 
(.4095) 
0.205*** 
(.0369) 
0.325 
(.2689) 
Family 
income 
0.00003*** 
(.000005) 
0.00005*** 
(.00001) 
0.00001*** 
(.000002) 
0.00001 
(.00001) 
0.00002*** 
(.000001) 
0.00002 
(.00001) 
Terrain28 – 0.055*** 
(.0201) 
– 0.318*** 
(.0795) 
– 0.046*** 
(.0145) 
– 0.059 
(.1438) 
  
Geographic 
location29 
0.050 
(.0579) 
– 0.085 
(.2294) 
    
Old 
Revolutionary 
Areas 
– 0.027 
(.0423) 
– 0.019 
(.1325) 
– 0.013 
(.0259) 
– 0.2478 
(.2774) 
  
Suburb  0.183 
(.1087) 
0.576* 
(.2962) 
– 0.270*** 
(.0515) 
– 0.502* 
(.2855) 
  
Impoverished 
Areas 
– 0.274*** 
(.0393) 
– 0.158** 
(.0677) 
– 0.110*** 
(.0213) 
– 0.589*** 
(.2198) 
  
Province – 0.008*** 
(0.0011) 
– 0.004 
(0.0044) 
– 0.005*** 
(.0008) 
0.009 
(.0079) 
0.000000001 
(.000000009) 
– 0.0000003 
(.0000007) 
N 7,515 697 7,221 119 6,963 105 
 a Data from the Chinese Household Income Project Surveys. Quality of children is the dependent variable. Multiple-birth 
samples were abstracted from the original larger samples. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical        
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
                                                          
28 Terrain includes the land features: 1. Plain; 2. Plateau; and 3. Mountainous region. Data was not available for the 
1995 and 2002 samples.  
29 Geographic location includes: 1. Lakeside regions; 2. Coastal regions; 3. others.  Data was not available for the 
1995 and 2002 samples.  
As the one-child policy abruptly intervened in the process of human reproduction by imposing a 
limit on the number of children a household could have, the insignificant gender effect identified 
in the 2002 sample is not necessarily an indication that a significant change had taken place in the 
son preference culture in rural China, but rather is an indication of the effect of the one-child policy 
in limiting the number of children, while the ‘Nine Year Compulsory Education System’ left rural 
households with little room to exercise their son preference by differentiating their children’s level 
of educational attainment based on their gender. 
As a robustness check, we used multiple-birth samples which only contained twins, triplets and so 
on (e.g. members of each set of twins, triplets, etc., were required to be opposite sexes) to test for 
the son preference effect on the quality of children. Gender is confirmed to be the single most 
important factor used by parents in rural China in determining each of their children’s level of 
educational attainment. We believe that the high dropout rates of girls had nothing to do with the 
level of difficulty of subjects at school, given that most of the children in the 1988 and 1995 
samples only completed their education at a level below senior middle school. We conclude that 
the additional number of years’ education provided to male children from rural families was an 
intentional act by parents at the cost of their female children. The human capital loss of the female 
children is not an accidental coincidence given that twins, triplets and so on of opposite sexes are, 
on average, not very different from each other in their inheritable genomes, and hence their ability 
to complete a basic level of education30. The significant loss in human capital, as a result of 
receiving an inadequate level of education, is very likely to be an adverse consequence of the son 
preference. The results are remarkably robust and are in line with what we expected.  
It is important to note that all independent variables in Table 1 have reasonably small correlations 
with each other, and more importantly, the gender variable has small absolute correlations of 
approximately 0.10 with any of the other independent variables. The results concerning the effect 
made by gender on the quality of children remain unchanged and significant if we drop any or all 
of the independent variables, which further confirms the robustness of the explanatory power of 
the gender variable on the quality of children.  
                                                          
30 It comprises the two stages primary education and lower secondary education. 
Table 2 
The effect of a Son Preference on the Quality of Children for Urban Populations a – with indicator 
variables for age groups 
  1988 1995 2002 
 Larger sample Multiple Births 
Sample 
Larger sample Multiple Births 
Sample 
Larger sample Multiple 
Births Sample 
Gender – 0.041 
(.0319) 
– 0.163 
(.1773) 
0.105*** 
(.0395) 
0.158 
(.3873) 
0.275** 
(.0568) 
 
Quantity – 0.047** 
(.0196) 
– 0.047 
(.1298) 
– 0.128*** 
(.0294) 
 – 0.305*** 
(.0532) 
 
Education 
(Father) 
0.161*** 
(.0100) 
– 0.061 
(.0796) 
0.199*** 
(.0127) 
0.216 
(.2494) 
0.229*** 
(.0212) 
 
Minority  – 0.247*** 
(.0285) 
0.580 
(.3543) 
0.024 
(.0891) 
 – 0.050 
(.1155) 
 
Family 
income 
0.000005 
(.0000004) 
0.0001 
(.0001) 
0.00002*** 
(.000004) 
– 0.00004 
(.00006) 
0.00001*** 
(.000004) 
 
Residential 
location b 
0.017 
(.0211) 
– 0.474*** 
(.1683) 
– 0.032 
(.0275) 
– 0.3493 
(.6791) 
– 0.148*** 
(.0400) 
 
Province – 0.031*** 
(.0012) 
0.003 
(.0076) 
– 0.003** 
(.0013) 
0.027 
(.0182) 
– 0.001 
(.0018) 
 
N 3,689 106 3,336 3831 2,213 Insufficient 
 a Data from the Chinese Household Income Project Surveys.  
b Residential location is specified as: 1. City center; 2. City; 3. Suburbia; 4. Exurbia.  
Quality of children is the dependent variable. Multiple-birth samples were abstracted from the original larger samples. 
Standard    errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
For the rural sample, the quantity of children was found to exert significantly negative effects on 
the quality of children, but the magnitude of its effect on the quality of children was overshadowed 
by the gender effect. Children from households with fathers who had a higher level of educational 
attainment on average received relatively higher levels of education. The government’s 
preferential treatment of minority ethnic groups took effect on the quality of children in the later 
waves of CHIPS. Meanwhile, children who lived in mountainous areas, impoverished areas and 
less economically developed provinces32 attained lower levels of education compared with other 
children living in better economically developed areas of China.  
                                                          
31 For the multiple-birth sample, we intentionally dropped the minority variable to ensure a sufficient number of 
observations could be used for the regression analysis.  
32 Provinces are ordered in their level of economic development, so the province with higher rank has lower level of 
economic development.  
The results concerning urban populations are presented in Table 2. Contrary to the findings from 
the rural samples, a son preference was not confirmed to have a significant impact on the quality 
of children in our urban samples. More specifically, no significant difference between the 
educational attainment of male children and female children was evident from the 1988 CHIPS 
data, while female children even obtained slightly higher levels of educational attainment than 
male children in the 1995 CHIPS data, and in 2002 they had significantly surpassed male children 
in their level of educational attainment. We believe that this change from females being at a 
significant disadvantage in their education in rural areas, to females enjoying more equality in 
urban areas is a result of the shift from a very strong son preference environment to an environment 
which is more gender equal and/or gender tolerant. These contrasting results between the rural and 
urban areas sheds some light on the merit of our use of gender to capture the effect of a son 
preference on the quality of children. The educational attainment of a person who lives in an urban 
area is more likely to be determined by the child’s keenness to study and perform at school, as 
well as their family’s attitude towards education and the household resources. By the comparison 
of the educational attainment of children of both genders and from rural and urban areas, a 
significant negative gender effect on the quality of children provides strong evidence of the 
presence of a son preference in rural China. 
4.2 The effect of a son preference on the quantity of children 
The total number of children in a household is likely to be determined by its economic wellbeing, 
the expected quality of the children, as well as its associated demographic, social and cultural 
factors, and other random factors. The total number of children to have is unlikely to be decided 
at the outset of a marriage, and the ideal and realized family size may differ significantly from 
each other. The process, from the first-born to the last-born, will take many years to complete in a 
changing environment. Our findings are able to shed some light on the potential mechanisms 
underlying these choices.  
Although gender is found to have a positive effect for both the rural and urban samples, this does 
not necessarily imply that a son preference existed in both areas. This is because, for instance, a 
mixed sex composition of their children is something preferred by people from very different 
cultures, which is not specified in the reduced form model (2) used to estimate the results in Table 
3. We argue that the results in Table 3 may be informative about the sign of the relationship 
between child’s gender and the quantity of children, but not about its magnitude, as the elasticity 
also depends on the birth order of the first-born son.  
Table 3 
The effect of a Son Preference on the Quantity of Children  
  1988 1995 2002 
 Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Gender 0.220*** 
(.0310) 
0.018 
(.0238) 
0.175*** 
(.0211) 
0.093*** 
(.0231) 
0.176*** 
(.0201) 
0.085*** 
(.0223) 
Quality  – 0.061*** 
(.0128) 
– 0.074*** 
(.0097) 
– 0.040*** 
(0.0119) 
– 0.021** 
(.0101) 
– 0.066*** 
(.0092) 
– 0.045*** 
(.0079) 
Education 
(Father) 
0.034*** 
(.0095) 
0.096*** 
(.0087) 
– 0.041*** 
(.0098) 
0.008 
(0.0077) 
– 0.018* 
(.0096) 
0.003 
(.0086) 
Minority  0.359*** 
(.0584) 
0.072*** 
(.0242) 
– 0.174*** 
(.0410) 
0.040 
(.0529) 
– 0.206*** 
(.0286) 
0.133*** 
(.0462) 
Family income 0.0001*** 
(.000006) 
0.000001*** 
(.0000003) 
0.00002*** 
(.000002) 
– 0.00003 
(.00003) 
0.00001*** 
(0.000001) 
0.000008 
(.000001) 
Terrain 0.011 
(.0227) 
 0.039*** 
(.0147) 
   
Old 
Revolutionary 
Areas 
– 0.118*** 
(.0476) 
 0.012 
(.0264) 
   
Suburb  – 0.092 
(.1224) 
 – 0.085*** 
(.0524) 
   
Impoverished 
Areas 
0.198*** 
(.0447) 
 – 0.104*** 
(.0217) 
   
Residential 
location 
 0.040** 
(.0184) 
 – 0.013 
(.0164) 
 0.042*** 
(.0160) 
PROVINCE – 0.013*** 
(0.0012) 
– 0.014*** 
(.0010) 
0.005*** 
(0.0008) 
0.002** 
(.0007) 
0.0000008*** 
(.00000007) 
0.002*** 
(.0007) 
N 7,515 4,397 7,221 3,340 6,988 2,230 
 
a Data from the Chinese Household Income Project Surveys. Standard errors in parentheses. Quantity of children is the 
dependent variable. ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
Given that the results regarding the gender effect on the quantity of children remain qualitatively 
unchanged, with or without the other independent variables, this enabled us to only make use of a 
more parsimonious model (3) compared to that used in Table 3 for the estimation of the gender 
effect on the quantity of children.  
A nonlinear Poisson regression33 and sorting the sample by birth orders were employed to account 
for the fact that the dependent variable is a count measure and a probabilistic feature of the decision 
making faced by each household when deciding on the number of children to have. The results are 
presented in Table 4. It is important to note that because we have used children of all ages in 
estimating the results in Table 4, the one child policy itself could have a negative impact on the 
quantity of children. Therefore, some cautions need to be taken in interpreting the findings. 
Each column reports the estimation results specifically based on the observations corresponding 
to each birth order. The progressive nature of the decision making for the number of children is 
well captured by both independent variables. For the independent variables, Row1 reports their 
coefficients, Row 2 reports the clustered robust standard error, and Row 3 reports the marginal 
effects in a semi-elasticity form. For indicator variables, such as our two independent variables, 
the marginal effect represents the percentage change in the probability of having more children 
when the indicator variable moves from zero to one. Overall, the previous results concerning 
gender on the quantity of children remained qualitatively unchanged. With regard to the urban 
population, the gender effect for each birth order on the quantity of children is found to be 
insignificant across the three waves of urban samples (see columns (4), (5) and (6) in Table 4).    
                                                          
33 The equality of its mean and variance of count data processes is not a reasonable assumption, which is assumed to 
be true in the Poisson regression. Its presence renders untenable the assumption of a Poisson distribution for the error 
process. A reasonable alternative is negative binomial regression, which allows the variance to differ from the mean. 
The estimation results from using the negative binomial regression are not qualitatively different from the Poisson 
regression. 
For rural households where the first-born is a girl, the estimates in column (1) suggest that their 
probability of having two or more children is significantly higher than that of the first-born son 
families across the three wave of CHIPS, with these probabilities ranging from 16.9% to 30%. It 
is interesting to note that the probability is higher in the later years’ samples across the three 
surveys. Three observations are in place: first, the higher probability of rural households having 
two or more children in the later years’ samples, if the first child is a girl, clearly indicates that the 
level of son preference is not decreasing in China’s rural areas; second, a sharp rise in income 
within a short space of time does not necessarily lead to a sizable reduction in the level of son 
preference in societies with a traditionally strong son preference; third, the one-child policy has 
aggravated the urgency of those households with a son preference to have two or more children to 
realize having a son, even if that meant breaching the one-child policy, if their first child was a 
girl. This also explains why the one-child policy was not effective in reducing China’s fertility rate 
during its earlier years (e.g. Zhang 2017; Wang 2019).  
The estimates in column (2) imply that, for households in which the first two children are girls, 
the probability of having three or more children is higher than for those families which already 
had a son. The probability ranges from 0.3% to15.2% across the three waves of CHIPS, where the 
earlier years’ rural samples are associated with a larger probability. The later years’ rural samples 
having a smaller or even statistically insignificant probability of having three or more children is 
intuitive, because the one-child policy was implemented more strictly in its later years and the 
authorities kept a close eye on those who had already breached the policy. Severe punishments, 
ranging from stiff financial fines, the confiscation of property, and even forced abortions 
(Jimmerson 1990) were imposed on many such “lawbreakers”. As a consequence, we suspect that 
the statistically insignificant probabilities of having three or more children in the later years’ 
sample is a result of the one-child policy. By comparison, using the U.S. census data, Dahl and 
Moretti (2008) reported a statistically insignificant probability of having two or more children, if 
the first child was a girl, and reported a probability of having three or more children at only 0.6% 
higher than the first-born son families34. The estimates in column (3) suggest that, in households 
                                                          
34 Although, they did not report the probability of having three or more children for households in which the first two 
children were girls, we believe the probability will be increased only slightly, and it is still much smaller than ours. 
The contrasting difference between our results and those of Dahl and Moretti (2008) can be explained by the fact that 
with no son, the probability of having four or more children was higher than for those families in 
which at least one of their first three children was a boy, with the probability ranging from 9.1% 
to13.4% across the three waves of CHIPS, although this was only significant statistically in 198835.  
    Table 4 
    The effect of a Son Preference on the Quantity of Children – Poisson regression 
              1988  
 Rural  Urban 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Birth order  
(of girl) 
1 
0.063*** 
(.0124) 
0.169 
   0.010 
(.0181) 
0.016 
  
 
2 
 0.051*** 
(.0147) 
0.152 
   0.020 
(.0263) 
0.046 
 
3   0.034* 
(.0212) 
0.124 
   0.044 
(.0442) 
0.142 
SonDummy  – 0.081*** 
(.0178) 
– 0.243 
– 0.061*** 
(.0212) 
– 0.227 
  – 0.056* 
(.0309) 
0.130 
0.039 
(.0513) 
0.126 
Log likelihood – 13547.88 – 13537.64 – 8183.21  –10201.91 – 4973.82 – 1460 
VIF36  1.77 1.96  1.00 1.86 1.50 
N 9,653 8,212 4,857  7,644 3,469 936 
        1995  
Birth order 
(of girl) 
1 
0.143*** 
(.0124) 
0.295 
   0.011 
(.0262) 
0.012 
  
 
2 
 0.018 
(.0209) 
0.045 
   -0.002 
(.0713) 
-0.004 
 
                                                          
the level of son preference in China is much stronger than in the U.S., and the social environment in China is more 
tolerant towards gender inequality than in the U.S. 
35 We suspect that the statistically insignificant probability of having four or more children in 1995 and 2002 was a 
result of the one-child policy. 
36 Variance inflation factor (VIF) is often considered superior to examining the bivariate correlations. A commonly 
accepted rule of thumb is that VIFs of 10 or higher prompt concerns for high correlations between independent 
variables. The reported VIFs are much smaller than 10, hence the potential bivariate correlations between the two 
indicator variables is not a concern for us. 
3   0.028 
(.0299) 
0.091 
    
Son Dummy  – 0.169*** 
(.0251) 
– 0.418 
– 0.048 
(.0356) 
-0.160 
  – 0.015 
(.0891) 
– 0.032 
 
Log likelihood – 10991.94 – 7827.63 – 3070.23  – 5662.77 – 710.84  
VIF  1.38 1.43   1.39  
N 7,515 5,301 1,942  5,294 5,37 Insufficient 
        2002  
Birth order  
(of girl) 
1 
0.160*** 
(.0163) 
0.300 
   0.009 
(.0240) 
0.012 
  
 
2 
 0.001 
(.0215) 
0.003 
   0.0004 
(.0467) 
0.0008 
 
3   0.04 
(.0325) 
0.134 
   0.011 
(.1431) 
0.033 
SonDummy  -0.134*** 
(.0265) 
–  0.324 
0.017 
(.0429) 
0.056 
  – 0.028 
(.0552) 
0.059 
– 0.015 
(.1635) 
– 0.047 
Log likelihood – 11767.75 – 7333.53 – 2469.91  – 6465.59 – 1632.09 – 171.75 
VIF  1.35 1.36   1.38 1.76 
N 8,312 5,010 1,556  5,635 1,211 113 
 a Data from the Chinese Household Income Project Surveys. Standard errors in parentheses. Quantity of children is the 
dependent variable. Top panel: Poisson regression for 1988 for each birth order and for both rural and urban samples 
separately. Middle panel: Poisson regression for 1995 for each birth order and for both rural and urban samples separately. 
Lowest panel: Poisson regression for 1995 for each birth order and for both rural and urban samples separately. ***, **, * 
indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
The estimates in column (2) concerning the SonDummy variable suggest that having a son in the 
second birth significantly reduces rural households’ probability of having three or more children 
ranges from 24.3% to 41.8%, compare to households with their first two children are girls. The 
estimates in column (3) suggest that, having a son in their third birth further reduces rural 
households’ probability of having more children ranges from 5.6% to 22.7% compare to 
households with their first three children are girls, although it is only statistically significant in 
1988 rural sample. 
 
V. Model 
The reduced form analysis establishes the responsiveness of important decisions in the quantity 
and quality of children to changes in sex composition of their children and the birth of the first son. 
However, empirical findings have little information about the mechanism underlying the decisions 
of households. The model we have developed allows us to uncover the underlying mechanism of 
how a son preference affects both the quantity and the quality of children, and how a son preference 
changes the interactions between the two. To capture analytically the effects of a son preference 
on the quantity and quality of children, a model is required which is embedded within this 
heterogeneity of fertility and differentiated quality of children across households with or without 
a son preference. Therefore, it seems useful to go beyond Becker and his coauthors’ models to 
account for the issues arising out of differences in household choices due specifically to their 
different levels of son preference.  
Similar to Becker and Tomes (1976), we assume that a household has a utility function with the 
following form: 
                                                        𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑛, 𝑄, 𝑦)                                                           (4) 
where 𝑛 is the number of children, Q represents quality of each child in the household, and 𝑦 the 
aggregate amount of all other commodities. A household faces the following budgetary constraints: 
                                                       𝐼 = 𝑝𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑞𝑛𝑞,                                                         (5) 
where 𝑝𝑦 is the price of 𝑦, 𝑝𝑞 the average cost of increasing 𝑞 by one unit, and 𝐼 is the total family 
income. Therefore, 𝑝𝑦𝑦 is the total expenditure on the aggregate amount of all other commodities, 
and 𝑝𝑞𝑛𝑞 is the total cost of children.  
For a household with no son preference, their decision on the number of children is defined as   
                                                                𝑛 =  ⌊?̅?(𝜉)⌋⏟  
(𝑎)
or ⌈?̅?(𝜉)⌉⏟  
(𝑏)
.                                   
Here, ?̅?(𝜉)is the average number of children born into households which possess no son preference 
and share a similar characteristic ξ, such as geographic location, income and parents’ education 
level, where the floor and ceiling function is defined respectively as ⌊𝑥⌋ = max{𝑚 ∈ 𝕫|𝑚 ≤ 𝑥}  
and ⌈𝑥⌉ = min{𝑚 ∈ 𝕫|𝑚 ≥ 𝑥}.                             
For households with a son preference, we have assumed their decision about the number of 
children to have is jointly determined by the sex composition of their children after each birth37 
and other controlling factors (e.g. budget constraints, educational resources). In the following, we 
have assumed that once a son has been born into households with a son preference, they will 
behave very similarly in their fertility rate to those households with no gender preference. We 
propose that such households’ decisions about the number of children to have is governed by the 
following equation, based on the rationale that more births are expected for households with a son 
preference where no son has already been born, 
                                 𝑛 = ⌊?̅?(𝜉) × (1 + 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(?̅?(𝜉)) × 𝑆)⌋⏟                    
(𝑎)
 or ⌈?̅?(𝜉) × (1 + 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(?̅?(𝜉)) × 𝑆)⌉⏟                    
(𝑏)
            (6)                                                                                             
where 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(?̅?(𝜉)) is an indicator function which equals one if none of the children in ?̅?(𝜉) is a 
boy, and otherwise it equals zero. Therefore, the term ?̅?(𝜉) × 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(?̅?(𝜉)) × 𝑆  measures the 
number of additional children38 that households with a son preference intend to have to realize 
their son preference compared to those households with no son preference and possess similar 
characteristic 𝜉. Here, 𝑆 signifies the level of a son preference, which is defined as:  
                                                          
37 For example, the decision whether to have an additional child for households with a son preference depends on 
whether a son has been born into the households. 
38 The additional number of children is in the range of [0, ⌈𝑆 × ?̅?(𝜉)⌉], where the upper bound of the interval depends 
on the households’ level of son preference. It is equal to zero when there is already a son born into the family. 
Assuming that no son has been born into households with a son preference, on average, the additional numbers of 
children will be translated into a probability of having at least one son, which is the range of [0.75, 1 − (
1
2
)
⌈𝑆×?̅?(𝜉)⌉
]. 
For illustrative purposes, we assume an equal probability of having a son and of having a daughter. In reality, the 
probability of having a son and a daughter can differ significantly at different birth orders. 
                                                  𝑆 ∈ (0, 𝜂);   if a household possesses a son preference              (7) 
                                                  𝑆 = 0;          otherwise. 
An individual’s level of 𝑆 is partially determined by the level of intrusiveness of their surrounding 
environment in personal matters and the social attitude towards genders. The appreciation of the 
expected future value of a son is formed through learning and interactions with members of social 
communities.  
We modify Becker and Tomes’s (1976) assumption that the “the quality of each child is the same” 
to assume that the quality of each child is either perceived very similarly or very differently by 
each household, depending on their level of son preference. The households’ utilities are, to some 
extent, determined by the level of their son preference. Following this line of reasoning, we 
differentiate our definition of the quality of children from Becker and Tomes (1976) by 
incorporating the effect of a son preference on the perceived quality of a child from the parents’ 
perspective. This is defined as:  
                            𝑄𝑖 = 𝑒 +
∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
(1 + 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(𝑖) × 𝑆) = 𝑒 + 𝑞 + 𝑞 × 𝑆 × 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(𝑖)                   (8) 
where  𝑄𝑖  is (an element in the set 𝑄 ) the quality of the  𝑖
𝑡ℎ  child, 𝑞 (=
∑ 𝑞𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
 ) captures the 
households’ intention to contribute equal levels of quality to each of their children, and 𝑒 (i.e. the 
innate ability – the endowment) is assumed to be fixed for a household and it is considered as 
exogenous and independent of 𝑞. In addition, 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(𝑖) is an indicator function which equals one if 
the 𝑖𝑡ℎ child is a boy, and otherwise it equals zero. Therefore, equation (5) reveals the parents’ 
differentiation in the quality of their children based on their gender, where a female child receives 
approximately an average level of the households’ contribution (which is assumed to be equal to 
𝑞) towards their quality, but a male child receives preferential treatment subject to the parents’ 
level of son preference. The term 𝑞 × 𝑆 represents a household’s perceived additional “quality”39 
of a son compared to a daughter. 
                                                          
39 This is the quality perceived by parents due to their ability to continue the family line and bringing honor to the 
family and/or ancestors, and the higher earning power of male children compared to female children. 
For a given level of son preference40 and a fixed 𝑝𝑞, the household chooses the aggregate amount 
of all other commodities, the number of children 𝑛, and the level of quality of children 𝑄, to 
maximize the utility function in equation (4), subject to the budget constraints (5), son preference 
conditions (7), and the quality function (8). The maximization yields41:  
     
 𝑀𝑈𝑦  = 𝜆𝑝𝑦 = 𝜆𝜋𝑦
                                     𝑀𝑈𝑄𝑖  =
𝜆𝑛𝑝𝑞
1+𝑆×1𝑆𝑜𝑛(𝑖)
=
𝜆𝜋𝑄
1+𝑆×1𝑆𝑜𝑛(𝑖)
= 𝜆𝜋𝑄
′
                                    𝑀𝑈𝑛  = 𝜆𝑞𝑝𝑞 = 𝜆𝜋𝑛                                  
                                               (9)           
                                           𝑀𝑈𝑆   = 𝑀𝑈𝑛 × ?̅?(𝜉) × 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(?̅?(𝜉)) × 1𝐵(𝛽) + 𝑀𝑈𝑄𝑖 × 𝑞 × 1𝑆𝑜𝑛(𝑖) 
where 𝑀𝑈’s are the marginal utilities,  𝜆 is the marginal utility of income, 𝜋𝑄
′  is the “adjusted” 
shadow price of the quality of children dependent on the household’s level of son preference, and 
𝜋𝑛 is the shadow price of the quantity of children. It is important to note that our 𝜋𝑄
′  can be 
significantly smaller than the shadow price of the quality of children 𝜋𝑄 (= 𝑛𝑝𝑞) defined in Becker 
and Tomes (1976), and the difference between 𝜋𝑄
′  and 𝜋𝑄 depends on the household’s level of son 
preference. The impact of preferences for male offspring to female offspring on sex ratio at birth 
is obvious in son preference cultures, such as China and South Korea – as evidenced in their 
heavily skewed sex ratio at birth in China (since 1990) during the one-child policy as well as in 
South Korea from 1987-2006 (e.g. Wang 2019). This observation of a strong male preference at 
birth reinforces the importance of the potential discrepancy between 𝜋𝑄
′  and 𝜋𝑄 as a result of a son 
preference.  
Although both the shadow price of the quality of children, 𝜋𝑄
′  and 𝜋𝑄, are directly related to the 
quantity of children, 𝜋𝑄
′  is deemed to be less sensitive to the quantity of children than the 𝜋𝑄 
derived under the framework of Becker and Tomes (1976). An increase in the quantity of children 
inevitably increases the expenditure on children, however, to accommodate the increase in the cost 
of raising more children when more births appear to be a sine qua non for having a son, households 
                                                          
40 The level of son preference can range from it being better to have sons than daughters, to it being essential to have 
at least one son.  
41 We adopt here the notations from Becker and Tomes (1976) for the purposes of making a comparison between our 
construction and theirs. 
with a strong son preference are keener than other households on redistributing their resources 
among their children based on their gender. When it becomes economically unsustainable because 
of the large number of (female) children born before a son, households with a strong son preference 
may either embrace sex-selective abortions and/or the abandonment of baby girls (when the legal 
and social environments are tolerant of abortions and the abandonment of baby girls), or 
substantially reduce investment in their daughters to have one more child for the purposes of 
having a son. The additional number of children a household plans to have is subject both to their 
level of son preference and to any budget constraints, all else being equal.  
The shadow price of the quantity of children, 𝜋𝑛, is related to the quality of children. The higher 
the quality of children a household aims to achieve, the higher the cost of an additional child. For 
households with a son preference, for the purposes of having a son, they may reduce their 
contribution to the quality of their daughters to offset the increase in cost because of the need to 
have more children before having a son. Consequently, each daughter in such a household is likely 
to receive a discounted household contribution towards her quality, where the severity of the 
discount will depend on the level of son preference of the household. We found that the son 
preference reduces the social income42 of a son-preference household by 
𝑆𝑒𝜋𝑄
1+𝑆
, which signifies the 
potential loss of the household’s genetic endowment due to the son preference. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the endowment loss of 
𝑆𝑒𝜋𝑄
1+𝑆
 is related to the household’s total number of 
children, its level of genetic endowment and the son preference. For a given level of endowment, 
an increase in both (either) the number of children and (or) the level of son preference can cause 
substantial loss in social income as raising the quality of more children becomes more expensive, 
which further intensifies the unequal distribution of resources between sons and daughters. 
Considering a society as a whole, its aggregate loss in social income from households with a son 
preference can be enormous43. In addition, as a persistent and strong son preference culture 
                                                          
42 Household’s social income is defined as 𝜋𝑦𝑦 + 𝜋𝑛𝑛 + 𝜋𝑄
′ 𝑄 = 𝐼 + 𝜋𝑄
′ 𝑄. Hence, the difference between the two 
social incomes with and without son preference equals to the difference between 𝜋𝑄
′ 𝑄 = 𝜋𝑄(𝑒 + 𝑞) for 𝑆 =
0, and 𝜋𝑄
′ 𝑄 =
𝜋𝑄
1+𝑆
(𝑒 + 𝑞(1 + 𝑆)), that is 𝜋𝑄(𝑒 + 𝑞) −
𝜋𝑄
1+𝑆
(𝑒 + 𝑞(1 + 𝑆)) =
𝑆𝑒𝜋𝑄
1+𝑆
. 
43 That loss would depend on both the number of children born into the households with strong son preference, their 
level of endowment and the severity of their son preference. 
increases the inequality of human capital accumulation among males and females, it is not 
surprising that this lowers the average level of education and, therefore, economic growth.  
For households with a son preference, an increase in the market price 𝑝𝑞 has a more profound 
impact on the quality of children than on the quantity of children. This is because such households 
are more likely to further reduce their contribution to the quality of their children44, especially their 
daughters, to offset the impact due to the increase in the market price  𝑝𝑞 on the realization of their 
son preference, rather than to reduce the number of children before they have a son. It is those 
households with larger genetic endowments and which possess a strong son preference which 
experience larger losses in their social income. These losses can be explained by the fact that 
households with a son preference are very reluctant45 to invest in their daughters (e.g. in their 
education). The implications from our model provide further support for empirical findings which 
suggest that gender inequality in education (i.e. the contribution of a household to the quality of 
their children) lowers the average level of human capital (e.g. Klasen 2002).  
The marginal utility from the realization of a son preference is summarized byMUS . For a 
household with no son preference, having a son brings no additional utility to the family than 
having a daughter. However, for a household with a son preference, the additional utility generated 
from the realization of their son preference can be extremely large, with its size dependent on their 
level of son preference, which is well captured by the term MUS in equation (9). 
Take a two-child household with a son preference having both a son and a daughter as an example, 
the bias of the parents towards their children is captured by equations (10) and (11): 
                                                            𝑄𝑠 = 𝑒 + 𝑞(1 + 𝑆)                                                          (10) 
                                                            𝑄𝑑 = 𝑒 + 𝑞                                                                      (11) 
                                                          
44 Based on equation (8), we have  
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑛
= −𝑞 −
𝑞
𝑛
𝑆 < 0 (assuming the total quality of children 𝑄 is a linear function of 
𝑄𝑖), which shows that the existence of a son preference intensifies the sensitivity of the quality of children to the 
increase in the quantity of children. There are sufficient reasons to believe that this additional amount of negative 
impact of quantity on the quality of children due to a son preference will be largely passed down to the female children.  
45 Those with a strong son preference uphold the belief that “raising a daughter is like watering your neighbors’ 
garden”. 
where 𝑄𝑠  and 𝑄𝑑  is the parents’ perceived total quality of a son and a daughter, respectively, 
assuming both a son and a daughter possess the same endowment 𝑒, which provides them with the 
ability to achieve the quality 𝑞. Consequently, the difference between 𝑄𝑠 and 𝑄𝑑  is simply the 
result of the parents’ son preference. This difference is translated into the divergence in the 
marginal utility with respect to the quality of a son and of a daughter, subject to the budget 
constraints (5):  
                                                            𝑀𝑈𝑄𝑠 =
2𝜆𝑝𝑞
1+𝑆
= 2𝜆𝑝𝑞
′                                                       (12) 
            𝑀𝑈𝑄𝑑 = 2𝜆𝑝𝑞 
where 𝑀𝑈𝑄 are marginal utilities of quality. Although the market charges equally (𝑝𝑞) with regard 
to the cost of adding one unit of increase to the quality, irrespective of whether it is a boy or a girl, 
a household with a son preference considers that the cost of adding to the quality of a son is 
“worthier” or “cheaper” than it would be for a daughter46, based on equation (12). From equation 
(12), we also have: 
                                                            
𝑀𝑈𝑄𝑠
𝑀𝑈𝑄𝑑
=
1
1+𝑆
< 1.                                                             (13) 
The perceived costs of adding to the quality of a son were negatively related to the son preference, 
while the desired quality of a son is positively related to the parents’ preference. The paradox of 
value captured in the inequality (13) can be explained by the fact that households with a son 
preference tend to have higher expectations of sons than daughters, and the inequality (13) is 
theoretically justified by the law of diminishing returns of utility, given that parents place the 
quality of sons in a higher location on the utility curve than they do for daughters. It is in the 
interests of parents with a son preference to invest significantly more in their sons than their 
daughters. These households’ stronger willingness to add more quality to their sons than to their 
                                                          
46 Our finding differs from Becker and Tomes’s (1976), as we do not assume a “child-neutral preference”, but rather 
incorporate the potential impact of a son preference on the subsequent development of the quality of children of 
different genders. This finding is analogous to consumers who are willing to pay more for the brand of their preference 
than for other brands with indistinguishable quality in terms of such as functionality (but not in the quality associated 
with brand image). 
daughters inevitably reinforces the difference in the quality of sons and daughters if all else holds 
equal47.  
Some, but not all, parameters of the model can be estimated using the CHIPS data. The CHIPS 
data did not permit us to identify the level of son preference at an individual level, but did allow 
us to estimate the son preference on both a rural and an urban level. We relied on the presumption 
that the preferential treatment towards the education of males is a strong indication of a son 
preference, and therefore, we were able to measure the strength of the son preference as the 
difference between the gender effect on the quality of children in the corresponding rural and urban 
samples. A son preference can differ drastically between rural and urban areas in China, given that 
urban populations, for example, enjoy more job opportunities, and much more advanced 
educational and healthcare resources, and are influenced more by foreign cultures (which promote 
gender equality) than rural populations. In estimating the level of son preference which exists in 
rural China, we have taken the effect of gender on the quality of children in the corresponding 
urban sample as the benchmark (Table 2). The level of son preference for each of the three waves 
of CHIPS was estimated as follows: 
S𝑤 = |S𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙,w − 𝑆𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛,𝑤| = |𝛼2,𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙,𝑤 − 𝛼2,𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛,𝑤|.                   
The estimated son preference in rural China ranges from 0.20 to almost 148 across the three waves 
of CHIPS, where earlier years’ rural samples are associated with a stronger son preference. For 
each sample, the average quantity of children ?̅?(𝜉) and the average quality of children 𝑞 49, after 
controlling some of the characteristics 𝜉, can be easily calculated using the summary statistics in 
table A1 in the Appendix. However, it is not feasible to estimate 𝜆 and 𝑝𝑞 using our dataset.  
                                                          
47 Here, all else being equal means that children of a household inherit equal endowment, and these children put the 
same effort into improving their own quality.  
48 This is the difference between the effect of gender on the quality of children in a rural sample and its corresponding 
urban sample. 
49 Though the genetic endowment 𝑒 is not observable, it is not really vitally important to the main issues studies in the 
paper, and it can be removed from the equation simply by subtracting it from each individual overall quality 𝑄. As the 
son preference is really impacting on 𝑞 then on the overall quality 𝑄, therefore, our main interest lies in the estimated 
average quality 𝑞 rather than the overall quality 𝑄. In the table A1 where the average quality 𝑞 is captured by the 
variable Edu which represent the level of education rather than years of schoolings.  
 VI. Conclusion 
Our theoretical model sheds some light on the underlying mechanisms of how a son preference 
affects both the quantity and quality of children. The model shows that a son preference plays a 
critical role in determining the number of children, and the overall as well as the differentiated 
quality of male and female children.  
The empirical results highlight the fact that a son preference can have a strong influence both on 
the quantity of children and on the distribution of quality among children based on their gender. 
Overall, our empirical results are well in line with those predicted by our model. We report that 
female children born to households with a son preference obtain significantly lower levels of 
educational attainment than their male siblings, and a not yet realized son preference significantly 
increases the total number of children born into a household. We have found that a son preference 
exerts significantly more impact than that of the quantity of children on children’s quality. 
Regardless of how our findings are interpreted, however, the serious negative educational effects 
for female children and the significantly higher likelihood of having more children because of a 
son preference are interesting in their own right.  
Conclusions may be drawn on two fronts regarding the son preference effects on the quantity of 
children. Firstly, mixed gender preference is an important consideration in determining the number 
of children to have, and therefore, it is important to distinguish a son preference from a mixed 
gender preference. Secondly, it is difficult to estimate the effects of a son preference on the quantity 
of children as a household’s decision about the number of children to have is a progressive and 
dynamic process conditional on, for example, the gender at each birth order and whether a male 
has been born into a household. Both considerations suggest that great care should be taken when 
identifying of how a son preference impacts on the quantity of children. In order to do that in our 
empirical analyses, we first split the data by birth order, then regressed the quantity of children on 
the children’s gender at each birth, and a dummy variable which indicates whether a son has been 
born into a household. The combinational use of the two variables enabled us to distinguish a son 
preference from a mixed gender preference. For households with a son preference, having a female 
birth at each birth order significantly increased the probability of having more children, with a 
magnitude much larger than that suggested in Dahl and Moretti (2008). More interestingly, once 
such households have a son, that household’s likelihood of having more children reduces 
significantly. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Summary statistics of key variables for each sample 
1988 (Age>15): Data used in Table I, II and III 
   Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
 
Rural 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 3,737 3,823 3,692  707 757 504 216 84 26 6 
Edu  4.38 
(1.268) 
4.62 
(1.085) 
4.13 
(1.389) 
 4.51 
(1.210) 
4.44 
(1.179) 
4.34 
(1.273) 
4.24 
(1.340) 
4.34 
(1.475) 
4.19 
(1.438) 
3.76 
(1.432) 
   Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    4,737 2,402 1,073 301 78 22 2 
M/F   1.035  1.352 0.806 0.805 0.720 0.857 0.294  
    Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 2,744 2,287 2,110 1,483 932 279 42 8    
Edu 4.59 
(1.464) 
4.62 
(1.504) 
4.57 
(1.418) 
4.66 
(1.760) 
4.57 
(1.356) 
4.51 
(1.208) 
4.63 
(0.906) 
4.69 
(0.821) 
   
   Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    2,744 1,263 330 51 9   
M/F   1.084  1.229 0.844 1.075 0.759 0.500   
 
   Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
Multi-
birth  
-Rural 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 336 337 360  70 46 48 25 11 5 1 
Edu 4.28 
(1.476) 
4.71 
(1.184) 
3.87 
(1.602) 
 4.21 
(1.590) 
4.41 
(1.417) 
4.42 
(1.419) 
4.26 
(1.319) 
3.97 
(1.689) 
3.94 
(1.501) 
4.25 
(1.753) 
   Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    336 336 14 11    
M/F   0.936  0.988 0.888 1.333 0.571    
 
   Children No. of Children 
 
 
Multi-
birth  
-Urban 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 53 50 56  30 14 8 1    
Edu 4.91 
(0.991) 
5.00 
(1.195) 
4.82 
(0.765) 
 4.92 
(0.996) 
5.07 
(1.152) 
4.62 
(0.619) 
4.50 
(0.707) 
   
   Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    53 53      
M/F   0.893  0.893 0.893      
1995 (Age>15): Data used in Tables I, II and III 
   Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
 
Rural 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 4,152 4,133 3,088 1,900 1,585 537 112 16 2   
Edu 3.92 
(0.930) 
3.98 
(0.898) 
3.86 
(0.966) 
3.99 
(0.888) 
3.94 
(0.913) 
3.86 
(0.964) 
3.85 
(1.006) 
3.64 
(1.275) 
4.17 
(0.389) 
  
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    4,152 2,252 667 130 18 2  
M/F   1.34  1.658 1.047 0.928 0.940 0.636   
    Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 2,453 1,833 1,507 1,477 784 86 18     
Edu 5.39 
(1.199) 
5.36 
(1.205) 
5.43 
(1.192) 
5.43 
(1.209) 
5.39 
(1.190) 
5.22 
(1.201) 
5.38 
(1.128) 
    
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    2,453 797 83 7    
M/F   1.216  1.316 0.963 1.128 1.333    
    Children No. of Children 
 
 
Multi- 
birth  
-Rural 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 57 62 57  23 14 17 2 1   
Edu 3.73 
(0.880) 
3.82 
(0.820) 
3.63 
(0.938) 
 3.91 
(0.784) 
3.79 
(0.820) 
3.50 
(0.961) 
3.00 
(1.414) 
4.00 
(0.000) 
  
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    57 57 3 2    
M/F   1.088  0.965 1.192      
 
   Children No. of Children 
  Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Multi- 
birth  
-Urban 
N 19 19 19  16 3      
Edu 5.29 
(1.206) 
5.21 
(1.134) 
5.37 
(1.300) 
 5.44 
(1.190) 
4.50 
(1.049) 
     
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    19 18      
M/F  1.000  0.727 1.375      
 2002 (Age>15): Data used in Tables I, II and III 
   Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
 
Rural 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 4,736 4,372 2,616 2,956 1,382 332 58 8    
Edu 4.34 
(1.103) 
4.34 
(1.086) 
4.35 
(1.133) 
4.45 
(1.101) 
4.32 
(1.127) 
4.15 
(1.146) 
4.08 
(0.981) 
4.27 
(0.679) 
   
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    4,736 1,780 398 66 8   
M/F   1.671  2.073 1.070 1.287 0.692 3.00   
    Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
 
Urban 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 2,015 1,256 974 1,696 296 21 2     
Edu 6.07 
(1.394) 
5.91 
(1.416) 
6.27 
(1.337) 
6.16 
(1,354) 
5.85 
(1.490) 
5.63 
(1.286) 
3.75 
(0.463) 
    
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    2,015 193 20 2    
M/F   1.290  1.335 1.053 0.333     
    Children No. of Children 
 
 
Multi- 
birth 
-Rural 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 53 52 54  31 14 6 2    
Edu 4.02 
(0.796) 
4.12 
(0.855) 
3.92 
(0.730) 
 3.98 
(0.820) 
4.04 
(0.331) 
4.18 
(1.471) 
4.00 
(0.000) 
   
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    53 53      
M/F   0.963  1.944 0.472      
    Children No. of Children 
 
 
 
Multi- 
birth  
-Urban 
 Household M F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
N 4 4 4  4       
Edu  5.75 
(0.957) 
4.75 
(2.217) 
 5.25 
(1.669) 
      
    
Birth Order 
    1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 
N    4 4      
M/F   1.000  1.000 1.000      
 1988 : Data used in Table IV 
   Children Birth Order 
  Household M F 1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 
Rural N 9,655 13,588 12,462 9,653 8,212 4,857 2,197 795 254 66 15 
M/F   1.090 1.260 0.970 1.048 1.001 1.087 0.924 1.062 1.143 
 
Urban N 7,644 6,298 5,963 7,644 3,469 936 180 29 3   
M/F   1.056 1.110 0.951 1.013 1.250 0.706 2.000   
1995 : Data used in Table IV 
  Household M F 1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 
Rural N 7,515 8,507 6,819 7,515 5,301 1,942 450 93 21 4  
M/F   1.247 1.385 1.146 1.072 1.228 0.979 0.909 3.000  
 
Urban N 5,635 3,683 3,286 5,635 1,211 113 10     
M/F   1.121 1.164 0.928 1.306 1.000     
2002 : Data used in Table IV 
  Household M F 1th 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 
Rural N 8,312 8,940 6,435 8,312 5,010 1,556 395 87 14 1  
M/F   1.389 1.578 1.147 1.301 1.351 1.900 2.500   
 Urban N 5,294 3,121 2,733 5,294 537 23      
M/F   1.142 1.148 1.131 0.353      
Note: N represents the number of observations.  M is for male, F female. The figure in the cells under M and F is the number of 
male children and female children in total, respectively. M/F is the number of males per female. The figure in each cell under “No. 
of Children” is the number of households having the corresponding number of children.  The figures under “Birth Order” specify 
the number of children born in each birth order. Edu represents the level of education, where 8 is the highest education level, while 
1 is illiterate. We reported the mean level of education, and its standard deviation is included in brackets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Table A2 
      The effect of a Son Preference on the Quality of Children for Rural Populations a 
  1988 1995 2002 
 Larger 
Sample 
Multiple 
Births  
Larger 
Sample 
Multiple 
Births  
Larger 
Sample 
Multiple 
Births  
Gender – 0.501*** 
(.0267) 
– 0.830*** 
(.1008) 
– 0.151*** 
(.0212) 
– 0.215* 
(.1297) 
– 0.005 
(.0261) 
– 0.191 
(.1505) 
Quantity – 0.047*** 
(.0099) 
– 0.068* 
(.0361) 
– 0.039*** 
(.0116) 
– 0.163** 
(.0805) 
– 0.110*** 
(.0154) 
0.074 
(.1027) 
Education 
(Father) 
0.154*** 
(.0082) 
0.151*** 
(.0304) 
0.143*** 
(.0095) 
0.005 
(.0681) 
0.235*** 
(.0121) 
0.180** 
(.0855) 
Minority  – 0.268*** 
(.0392) 
– 0.194 
(.2005) 
0.268*** 
(.0404) 
1.395*** 
(.3496) 
0.194*** 
(.0371) 
0.111 
(.2035) 
Family 
income 
0.00003*** 
(.000005) 
0.00005*** 
(.00001) 
0.00001*** 
(.000002) 
0.00001 
(.00001) 
0.00002*** 
(.000001) 
0.00001 
(.00001) 
Terrain50 – 0.053*** 
(.0200) 
– 0.299*** 
(.0792) 
– 0.049*** 
(.0145) 
– 0.169 
(.1268) 
  
Geographic 
location51 
0.060 
(.0578) 
– 0.152 
(.2306) 
    
Old 
Revolutionary 
Areas 
– 0.024 
(.0418) 
– 0.049 
(.1302) 
– 0.012 
(.0260) 
– 0.340 
(.2176) 
  
Suburb  0.162 
(.1075) 
0.587* 
(.2976) 
0.281*** 
(.0515) 
– 0.191 
(.2617) 
  
Impoverished 
Areas 
– 0.268*** 
(.0392) 
– 0.127* 
(.0684) 
0.104*** 
(.0214) 
0.507*** 
(.2081) 
  
Province – 0.008*** 
(0.0011) 
– 0.007*** 
(0.0042) 
– 0.005*** 
(.0008) 
0.003 
(.0067) 
0.000000001 
(.000000009) 
– 0.0000007 
(.0000006) 
N 7,515 697 7,221 119 6,988 105 
 a Data from the Chinese Household Income Project Surveys. Quality of children is the dependent variable. Multiple-birth 
samples were abstracted from the original larger samples. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical        
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
50 Terrain includes the land features: 1. Plain; 2. Plateau; and 3. Mountainous region. Data was not available for the 
1995 and 2002 samples.  
51 Geographic location includes: 1. Lakeside regions; 2. Coastal regions; 3. others.  Data was not available for the 
1995 and 2002 samples.  
Table A3 
The effect of a Son Preference on the Quality of Children for Urban Populations 
  1988 1995 2002 
 Larger sample Multiple Births 
Sample 
Larger sample Multiple Births 
Sample 
Larger sample Multiple 
Births Sample 
Gender – 0.015 
(.0469) 
– 0.158 
(.1908) 
0.069* 
(.0398) 
0.158 
(.3873) 
0.355*** 
(.0562) 
 
Quantity – 0.210*** 
(.0276) 
– 0.013 
(.1266) 
– 0.062** 
(.0297) 
– 1.156** 
(.5639) 
– 0.334*** 
(.0531) 
 
Education 
(Father) 
0.127*** 
(.0147) 
– 0.012 
(.0689) 
0.202*** 
(.0128) 
0.067 
(.1043) 
0.236*** 
(.0214) 
 
Minority  – 0.180 
(.0407) 
0.430 
(.3370) 
0.041 
(.0909) 
 – 0.078 
(.1168) 
 
Family 
income 
0.000003*** 
(.0000006) 
0.000006 
(.0002) 
0.00002*** 
(.000004) 
– 0.00004 
(.00005) 
0.00002*** 
(.000004) 
 
Residential 
location52 
0.005 
(.0310) 
– 0.355 
(.1465) 
– 0.041 
(.0281) 
– 0.483 
(.3146) 
– 0.147*** 
(.0405) 
 
Province – 0.028*** 
(.0016) 
0.010 
(.0069) 
– 0.004*** 
(.0013) 
0.005 
(.0115) 
– 0.001 
(.0018) 
 
N 3,689 106 3,340 3853 2,213 Insufficient 
  a Data from the Chinese Household Income Project Surveys. Quality of children is the dependent variable. Multiple-birth samples 
were abstracted from the original larger samples. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicates statistical         
                                                          
52 Residential location is specified as: 1. City center; 2. City; 3. Suburbia; 4. Exurbia.  
53 For the multiple-birth sample, we intentionally dropped the minority variable to ensure a sufficient number of 
observations could be used for the regression analysis.  
